Stalingrad: Decisions Under Fire
Todd Eastman, Huxley College, Western Washington University,
Bellingham, WA 98225 email: eastski@clearwire.net
Abstract: Conflict analysis is used to evaluate the potential options players could be
expected to use to settle disputes. When compromise is not possible, the options for
settling disputes become limited. The Battle of Stalingrad is studied using basic conflict
analysis based on an historical summary.
Keywords: conflict analysis, Zukov, Paulus, Operation Barbarossa, Volga River,
Stalingrad

Introduction
War places two sides in violent opposition. Barring the successful settlement of conflict
by diplomacy, the outcome of war will produce a winner and a loser. When evaluating an
historical event, careful analysis of the options each side have at a given point in time
may reveal some of the decision making processes that influenced the event’s outcome.
Can conflict analysis help to understand the factors that influenced the Battle of
Stalingrad?

History
In June of 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union. The
front reached from the Baltic States in the north to the Black Sea in the south. Despite
rapid advances by the Germans using Blitzkrieg tactics, the September push into the
Soviet motherland had been reduced to a war of attrition and not the war of annihilation
Hitler had expected. The Germans had under estimated the level of Soviet preparation
and the economic resiliency.1 Within sight of Moscow, the German Army with already
extended supply lines met by another adversary, the oncoming winter. Stalin comments
in early November, “the winter promises [the enemy] nothing good.” Soviet leadership
clearly understood the strategic advantages of winter warfare.2 The Soviet defeat of the
Germans at Moscow though aided by the harsh winter conditions, was primarily the
result of the larger number of Soviet forces and a tremendous civilian effort directed at
improving fortifications.3 Operation Barbarossa ended with the German retreat from
Moscow in the spring of 1941.
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In early April of 1942, Hitler re-directed the German efforts to the agricultural, coal, and
oil producing regions of southern Russia. The push would give Germany needed
resources and separate the Soviet forces, in Moscow and further north in Leningrad, from
critical resources. Stalin’s intelligence sources noted the build-up and repositioning of the
German forces and responded by moving troops and armaments south along the Don
River.4 The German advance on the south had by mid-July, captured the region along the
Don R. that produced 60 per cent of Soviet Union’s coal supply. The German push south
continued toward the North Caucasus and the Caspian oil fields. To protect their eastern
flank, the Germans sent forces to seize the city of Stalingrad, a key manufacturing center
and the major regional port on the Volga River.5
The Soviet forces had taken horrific losses during the German offensive but Zhukov saw
opportunity in fighting the Germans at Stalingrad. The local Communist Party recruited
thousands of citizens to dig fortifications as the Muscovites had done a year earlier.
Bitterly fought battles marked the German advance on Stalingrad. On August 23, the
German Luftwaffe reduced the city to ruin, the next day German forces tried to seize the
city’s tank production facility at the converted tractor factory. Armed factory workers
joined Soviet soldiers to drive off the Germans.6 Hitler responded by ordering General
Paulus to take Stalingrad, more German resources were directed towards the effort. By
early November, the well-trained Germans troops under Paulus had pushed the Soviet
defenders out of the ruined city and onto the bank of the Volga R. Strong artillery support
from across the river bought time for the Soviets as the German press continued.7 But
excessive German dependence on poorly equipped and trained Italian, Hungarian, and
Romanian troops posted to the northern and southern flanks put Paulus’s troops in a
vulnerable position.8
On November 19, the Soviet Operation Uranus, also known as Zhukov’s Trap9, attacked
the weakly defended German flanks in a pincer move. On February 2, 1943, Paulus and
90,000 trapped German troops surrendered in Stalingrad.10 The course of the war on the
Soviet Western Front had changed; the German Army began a long series of retreating
battles that ended in Berlin in May 8, 1945 with Marshal Zhukov witnessing the signing
of the German surrender to the Soviet Union.11
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The point in time picked for an analysis of this conflict is early November 1942. Despite
the enormous scale of the Soviet-German war front, both Stalin and Hitler focused
tremendous human and material resources to the conflict in Stalingrad. The Germans
were in a less favorable position because of the long supply lines they had to maintain
and the prospect of another winter deep in Soviet territory. The Soviets, in contrast not
only gained advantage through the diminished German situation, but had since April,
been moving armaments, supplies, and troops to the east banks of the Volga in
preparation of springing “Zhukov’s Trap.” The Germans were further hampered by poor
intelligence estimates of the Soviet strength and will to fight.12 Both sides had more than
one million men and nearly 10,000 artillery guns and mortars. With 675 tank and assault
vehicles, the Soviets had a slight advantage over the Germans.13 Perhaps the most
significant factor in determining the options available to both sides were that both Hitler
and Stalin had issued fight at all cost orders. Hitler’s Directive No. 41 that authorized the
German push towards southern Russia contained “stand fast” orders that eliminated
retreat as a possible option.14 Stalin responded with his similar ‘Not One Step
Backwards’ order (No. 227) in late July.15
Conflict Analysis

The players are the Soviets (USSR) and Germany. The options for both sides are limited
by non-feasible outcomes due to the win or loose nature of this war and the conditions
imposed by the autocratic leadership of Hitler and Stalin. Options such as “retreat” or
“surrender” do not exist in this conflict. The Soviets can hold their position or attack the
Germans. The Germans can either continue the siege with current intensity or call in
support to intensify the siege.
The most preferential Soviet outcome would be that they attack while the Germans
continue the siege at the current intensity. The second most preferred Soviet outcome
would be that they hold their position while the Germans continue their siege at the
current intensity. For the Soviets, either holding position or attacking while the Germans
call in support, are less preferred but still acceptable due to the oncoming adequate
supplies, superior intelligence capacity, and the approaching winter.
The German’s most preferred outcome is that they call in support while the Soviets hold
position. Next in the German preference, order would be that they call in support while
the Soviets attack. Less preferential to the Germans are that they continue the siege at the
current intensity level and the Soviets either hold their position or attack.
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The Soviets are in the stronger position. German misperceptions of Soviet troop strength
and the Soviet willingness to follow Stalin’s ‘Not One Step Backwards’ order resulted in
too few troops and supplies to counter “Zhukov’s Trap.” Many of the German
misperceptions were based on Hitler’s “micro-management” of the push to obtain the
resources of southern Russia.16
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The stable states for the Soviets are outcomes 5 and 9; the German stable states are 10
and 5. Equilibiria exists at outcomes 5 and 9 since both outcomes are stable to both sides
in the Stalingrad conflict.
The conflict analysis suggests that conflict could be reduced if the Soviets hold their
position and the Germans continue their siege at the current level, or if the Soviets hold,
their position and the Germans call in support. Neither outcome actually happened.
More advanced conflict analysis methods may generate historically correct findings but
conflict analysis methods as explained by Fraser and Hiple may be best suited to settling
disputes rather than war. Dispute settlement is based on the sides or players moderating
behavior to reach a desired outcome. War, as practiced at Stalingrad, can only be won or
lost. The situation that amounts to a kill or be killed condition removes any value of the
equilibric outcomes; neither outcome seems likely to produce a clear winner.

Conclusion
The conflict at Stalingrad ended with the Soviet victory. The tremendous expenditure by
both sides in human and material resources indicates the importance both the Germans
and Soviets placed on achieving victory. War is fought not only at the battlefront but also
on the home front. Boin et al in the Politics of Crisis Management list five critical tasks
that address political dimensions of crisis. The linear progression of crises within the
political framework is described: sense making, decision making, meaning making
terminating, and learning.19 Not just the armies of states are involved in war, the public
also plays a role in such struggles.
Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were autocratic regimes. Hitler and Stalin
carefully controlled and shaped the release of information their citizens received from
Stalingrad. Meaning making through tight media control was needed to maintain public
support for the continuing war efforts. Casting the situation “in such a way that their
efforts to manage it are enhanced” is far easier in the absence of democratic processes.20
Media in autocracies can manipulate the truth and blend it with political needs to alter the
public sense of reality.
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The German’s propaganda effort during the early stages of the Stalingrad conflict
stressed the tremendous pace of advance and the high level of Soviet causalities. Even
before the Soviet offensive, reports of the high casualty rate among German troops were
leaking from the front back to Germany. When the pace of advance slowed, the German
propagandists took a more cautious approach so as not to encourage the idea that the war
did not require a degree of sacrifice.21 The efforts of the propaganda campaign were
shifted to trying to blunt the reports of the dismal conditions being experienced by the
troops at Stalingrad.22 When the Soviet offensive occurred, Hitler ordered all public
information from Stalingrad stopped though this did not alter the public perception that
Germany had been defeated. The German public’s view of Hitler’s effectiveness as a
military leader suffered from the defeat. 23
While the German propaganda delivery was reduced by their defeat at Stalingrad, the
Soviets increased their propaganda efforts. The Soviet propaganda was directed mainly
towards waging psychological war on the German public with radio broadcasts and
falsified letters from prisoners of war. The Soviet propaganda further undermined Hitler’s
propaganda program.
Crisis Analysis as described by Fraser and Hiple, and crisis management as described by
Boin et al., provided a good framework to carefully examine the Stalingrad conflict but
neither can accurately account for the extreme factors that define war. The Cold War
analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis is based on the premise that neither side will take an
overly aggressive action because of the potentially devastating effect of nuclear war.
Stalingrad was a different situation; the destruction of the other side is the desired
outcome for both sides.
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